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Abstract
Application of basic principles revolving around the constitutionalism into 
third wave democracies, produced such phenomenon as constitutions “without 
constitutionalism”. This paper will revisit and discuss this issue in the context of 
the Kyrgyz Republic. Main argument and thesis of the paper is following: Where 
a viable balance of power exists, a constitutional court acquires importance as 
a key element of that order, thus promoting the constitutionalism. If no such 
balance exists, the constitutional court will soon become a tool of the more 
dominant powers and thus lose its relevance for a genuine constitutional order. 
The abovementioned thesis will be demonstrated by the example of the work of 
Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic. Mainly it first aims at providing a 
proper foundation and basic understanding of constitutionalism, further revisiting 
this concept in the context of Former Soviet Union and finally will discuss the 
development of constitutionalism in Kyrgyzstan along with challenges faced by 
the court. 
Keywords: Constitutional Court, Constitutional Review, Constitutionalism, 
Kyrgyzstan, Separation of Powers.
Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
P-ISSN: 2460-0016 (print), E-ISSN: 2548-3870 (online)
https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev524
* Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the Human Rights program at the American University of Central Asia 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. A Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) candidate in Comparative Constitutional Law at 
the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
Constitution without Constitutionalism? Challenges to Constitutionalism in the Kyrgyz Republic
276 Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
I. T H E O R E T I C A L  B A C KG R O U N D : T H E  N O T I O N  O F 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
The scholarship of comparative constitutional law has experienced a vibrant 
grow over the past decade,1 especially the issues revolving around the constitutional 
review and the role of courts in maintaining and consolidating the process of 
democratization.2 As it was described by Shapiro, “what once appeared to be 
American exceptionalism came into play in most European, Continental ... and in 
some Asian democratic states.”3 The review of the current contemporary scholarship 
reveals emerging trends in the field of comparative constitutional law that is 
evolving both thematically and geographically. Substantial boom in literature is 
being observed outside of the western world from Latin America to Africa4 and from 
Former Soviet Union5 to Asia.6 These regions are also being consumed by emerging 
trends in comparative constitutional law as abusive constitutionalism,7 sham 
constitutions, constitutions without constitutionalism,8 failing constitutionalism.9 
The global trend towards “juristocracy”10 has greatly complemented to a 
new convergence of the overall role and functions of constitutional courts. The 
1 Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP Oxford, 2012); 
Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011); Mark Tushnet, 
Thomas Fleiner, and Cheryl Saunders, Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge, 2013); Ran Hirschl, 
Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP Oxford, 2014). 
2 Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, and Robert A. Kagan, Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
3 Martin Shapiro, "Courts in Authoritarian Regimes" in Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa; Rule by Law: The Politics 
of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 326. 
4  Douglas Greenberg Vice President et al., Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World: 
Transitions in the Contemporary World (USA: Oxford University Press, 1993).
5 Alexei Trochev, Judging Russia: The Role of the Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990–2006 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Justice, East and West: Democratic Legitimacy and 
Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Springer Science & Business Media, 
2002); Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer Science & Business Media, 2005).
6 Jiunn-rong Yeh, Asian Courts in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Rosalind Dixon and Tim Ginsburg, 
Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014); Albert H. Y. Chen, Constitutionalism 
in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in 
New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Andrew Harding and 
Penelope Nicholson, New Courts in Asia (Routledge, 2010).
7 David Landau, “Abusive Constitutionalism,” UCDL Rev. 47 (2013): 189.
8 H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions without Constitutionalism: An African Political Paradox,” in Constitutional-
ism and Democracy: Transitions in The Contemporary World, ed. Douglas Greenberg, S. N. Kartz, B. Oliviero and 
S. C. Wheatley (1993), 65- 80.
9 Armen Mazmanyan, “Failing Constitutionalism: From Political Legalism to Defective Empowerment,” Global 
Constitutionalism 1, no. 02 (July 2012): 313–33. 
10 Ran Hirschl, Towards juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, (Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 3.
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mere understanding of basic phenomenon of constitutional courts is now being 
deeply rooted in the notion of constitutionalism. As Ran Hirschl emphasized 
“sweeping worldwide convergence to constitutionalism … entails far more than a 
mere adherence to majority rule”.11 Due to shifting nature of constitutionalism, the 
democracy is no longer understood as “canonical” majority rule/ parliamentary 
sovereignty, but rather as “minorities possess legal protection in the form of 
a written constitution, which even a democratically elected assembly cannot 
change”.12 It still remains unclear what does constitutionalism mean? Are 
there any criteria or definition against which the global constitutionalism can 
be tested? Overall there is no strictly defined definition or understanding of 
constitutionalism. According to Andras Sajo “constitutionalism is closely linked 
to traditional nineteenth century liberalism, which always escaped textbook 
definitions and resisted positive description”.13 However, existing scholarly literature 
in the field of constitutionalism share common traits that constitutionalism is a 
set of principles, ideals and values revolving around the organizational structure 
of government.14 Reviewing the works of scholars as Andras Sajo, Giovanni 
Sartori, Michel Rosenfeld and Louis Henkin one can blueprint such principles 
of limited nature of government, respect for individual rights and rule of law as 
core values associated with constitutionalism.15 One may ask what the limited 
government means. The primary understanding of limited government lays on 
written nature of constitution. As Chief Justice Marshal emphasized in Marbury 
vs. Madison, the entire purpose of writing the US constitution was to limit the 
government, not to empower it.16 Existing scholarly literature in deliberative 
democracy highlights basic role of judicial review as a complementary tool in 
11 Ibid., 2.
12 Ibid., 2.
13 Andras Sajo, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Central European University Press, 1999). 9-13.
14 Cass R. Sunstein, “Constitutionalism after the new deal,” Harvard Law Review 101, no. 2 (December 1987): 421-
423; Bruce Akerman, “The Rise of World Constitutionalism,” Virginia Law Review 83, no. 4 (1997): 788-791.
15 Andras Sajo, Limiting Government, 9-13; Giovanni Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion,” American 
Political Science Review 56: 853-859; Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutionalism, identity, difference and legitimacy: theo-
retical perspective (Duke University Press, 1994), 5-10; Louis Henkin, “A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic 
Influence and Genetic Defects” in Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspective, 
ed. Michel Rosenfeld, 40-42.
16 Marbury V. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), 177. 
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ensuring the limited nature of government.17 Application of basic principles 
revolving around the constitutionalism into third wave democracies, namely 
African/Asian and Former Soviet Union countries produces an interesting 
paradox. Namely, range of constitutions “without constitutionalism”18 and “sham 
constitutions”.19 As Mazmanyan highlighted the constitutionalism in former 
Soviet Union States “has failed to meet the definition in several ways, but most 
importantly in that it continuously lacked sensitivity to the most essential aspect 
limit on government.”20
II. DISCUSSION
2.1 Hardships Faced by FSU Courts: from Shut Down to Major Institutional 
Reconfiguration 
At the end of the twentieth century, along with precipitous collapse of 
communist regimes across the East and Central Europe, culminating in the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, the broad transformational 
trend toward democratization included dutiful processes of constitution-making 
and, as part of it, establishment of constitutional courts. These newly emerging 
democracies became active producers of constitutional courts21 and late 1980's 
turned into the period of “the great constitutional borrowings.”22 
17 Hans Kelsen, “Pure Theory of Law” German edition by Max Knight Published. Gloucester, Mass. ; Peter Smith, 
1967, 1989; Michel Rosenfeld, “The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy,” Southern Cali-
fornia Law Review: 1307-1351; Nino, Carlos Santiago, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (Yale University 
Press, 1996); Chapter VII: Judicial Review in a Deliberative Democracy, 187-216; John Hart Ely, Democracy and 
distrust (1980), 73-104; Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1986), 1-29; Aharon Barak “The Judge in 
a Democracy” part 1 the Role of the Judge 1- 88.
18 H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions without Constitutionalism".
19 David S. Law, Mila Versteeg, “Sham Constitutions,” 101 California Law Review (2013): 865-911, http://scholarship.
law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4207&context=californialawreview.
20 Armen Mazmanyan, “Failing Constitutionalism: from Political Legalism to Defective Empowerment,” Global 
Constitutionalism (2012): 313-333. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381711000128.
21 Wojciech Sadurski, Rights before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer, 2005), 3; Radoslav Prochazka, Mission Accomplished on Founding Constitutional 
Adjudication in Central Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002), 16; Kim Lane Scheppele, 
“A Comparative View of the Chief Justices` Role. Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents 
and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154: 1757-
2006; Wojciech Sadurski, “Constitutional Justice, East and West: Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts 
in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective,” Kluwer Law International, (2002).
22 Wiktor Osiatynski, “Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowings” International Journal of Constitutional law (2003): 
244-268; Vlad Perju, “Constitutional transplants, borrowing and migrations” in Oxford Handbook of compara-
tive constitutional law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (Oxford University Press, 2012),1304-1327; Vicki 
C. Jackson, “Comparative constitutional law: methodologies” in Oxford Handbook of comparative constitutional 
law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (Oxford University Press, 2012), 54-74.
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union majority of states were functioning 
through introducing amendments to previous Soviet Constitutions. It generally 
took from 2 up to 4 years for different states to establish constitutional courts. 
However, by the time of the establishment and in the process of negotiations 
the courts were already disciplined through reforms and major court shut downs. 
This could be illustrated in the example of Russian Constitutional Court, 
since this particular state was the first signal upon what the entire region 
followed a certain constitutional pattern- namely the wave of constitutional court 
suspensions.23 By the time of the final adoption of the constitution President 
Yeltsin was able to firmly concentrate power and furthermore to make sure that 
the most sympathetic draft would go into the referendum.24 The constitution 
drafting of the first Constitution of RF was a back and force rival between 
president and parliament. The question about legitimacy of the court was not 
discussed whatsoever. However, after the popular support in referendum Eltsin 
gained confidence and called for a Constitutional Assembly to draft a new 
constitution. The draft constitution that the assembly was working was based 
on presidential draft however yet incorporated many elements of parliamentary 
draft as well.25 But the Supreme Soviet refused to ratify it, because “accepting the 
documents that resulted from a presidential initiative was, therefore, tantamount 
to a surrender.”26 President Eltsin issued an edict suspending the work of the 
legislature and existing RSFSR constitution. Supreme Soviet and Constitutional 
Chamber had emergency meeting both of them condemned the actions of 
president however both the media and army was controlled by president. He 
used his authority blockaded the white house and arrested certain members of 
the Supreme Soviet. As a result of it the constitutional court was suspended.27 
Referendum was called and the constitution was adopted in December 1993. 
23 Armen Mazmanyan, “Failing Constitutionalism: From Political Legalism to Defective Empowerment,” Global 
Constitutionalism 1, no. 02 (July 2012): 316.
24 Jane Henderson, The Constitution of the Russian Federation: A Contextual Analysis (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), 67.
25 Ibid., 69.
26 Ibid., 76. 
27 Ibid., 86.
Constitution without Constitutionalism? Challenges to Constitutionalism in the Kyrgyz Republic
280 Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
According to Sadurski, Constitutional Courts of Central Asian countries along 
with other Former Soviet Union states attempted to acquire their legitimacy on 
dealing with separation of powers disputes rather then fundamental rights. Most 
of the Courts were strongly empowered by the constitutional arrangements to 
settle disputes instead of dealing with rights.28 Other scholars as Mazmanyan 
describe the period of early constitution drafting “the pattern of constitutional 
romanticism”.29 However, this period did not last long, romanticism ended after 
number of activist attempts taken by constitutional courts to deal with separation 
of powers issues. It started first in Russia in 1993 when President Yeltsin suspended 
the Constitutional Court in response to its decision, which was evidently against 
the will of the President. The wave of suspensions continued in Kazakhstan 
(1995) where President Nazarbaev substituted the Constitutional Court with new 
institutional named Constitutional Council that up to this date remains loyal 
agent of President.30 It was also a response to the Courts decision on SOP, which 
was decided against the will of the President. Finally, Belarusian Constitutional 
Court in 1996 has also suffered the end of “constitutional romanticism” when 
President Lukashenko forced the resignation of Constitutional Court Judges 
and replacement of them by judges who remain loyal to Lukashenko up to this 
date as well. Starting as a signal from Russia this wave of suspension captured 
almost entire FSU region either directly or indirectly.31 Some states were directly 
influenced by it and followed the pattern of Russia by packing courts (Belarus); 
others were indirectly influenced by introducing constitutional amendments 
(Kazakstan). In other states courts managed to survive however loosing their 
legitimacy and becoming disciplined agents of the incumbent (Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan).
What is even more paradoxical is that the courts in this region is being 
empowered more and more. Alexei Trochev in his book "Judging Russia" presents 
28 Wojciech Sadurski, Rights before courts.
29 Armen Mazmanyan, “Failing Constitutionalism: From Political Legalism to Defective Empowerment,” Global 
Constitutionalism 1, no. 02 (July 2012) p. 316.
30 D. Nurumov & V. Vashcankha, Constitutional Development of Independent Kazakhstan in R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, 
Semi-Presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia (2016).
31 Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago London : The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2000). 
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an interesting observation on evolving nature of the constitutional review power in 
Russian Federation. His major concern is why the power of Russian Constitutional 
Court strengthens while the “Russian democracy weakens”.32 His comprehensive 
research suggests that it has been done on purpose, namely the empowerment 
of the judiciary in Russia was not based on good will of the politicians, rather 
it was a product of their hidden motives driven by their own self-interest and 
self-ambitions. Analysis of the case law of RCC made by Trochev from 1990-2006 
revealed the fact that the expansion of constitutional review in Russia allowed 
the executive branch to expand their own power over the legislative.33 
Despite this massive process of constitutional courts suspensions, there were 
very few countries that somehow managed to survive this wave of suspensions 
and overall the influence of “post constitutional romanticism”. Among those 
states are Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. To certain extent Armenia and Georgia can 
be included to this list as well. This was due to the fragmented nature of politics 
and due to political uncertainty. Existing in such conditions the courts of Ukraine 
and Kyrgyzstan became more of strategic courts. Furthermore, this exceptional 
cases demonstrate more or less smooth and objective application of insurance 
theory in the region. This was due to the fragmented nature of the politics 
which again traces us back to the main hypothesis under the insurance theory. 
2.2. Kyrgyz Constitutional Court and Constant Change of Roles: From Loyal 
Agent of the President to the Agent of Neutrality 
First democratic constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic established Constitutional 
Court following the German model of centralized/concentrated system of judicial 
review. Unlike current Constitutional Chamber the Court had power to conclude 
on constitutionality of election results, which gave a great opportunity for former 
President Akaev to use this power of the court for his own sake. From the early 
decisions of this institute one was able to see Court`s constant expansion of the 
powers of the President.
32 Alexei Trochev, Judging Russia: The Role of the Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990–2006 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).
33 Ibid.
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The constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic has been revised 8 times in the 
last 25 years. Then-President Akayev, between the years of 1994 and 2003, with 
the help of the referendum, introduced four of these eight amendments. Below 
is a brief description of these amendments:
• The Constitution of Independent Kyrgyzstan was adopted in 199334.
• In October 1994, as the result of a referendum, the “Jogorku Kenesh” 
Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic was divided into two chambers.
• In February 1996, President Akayev called for another referendum, which 
resulted in a substantial increase of presidential powers under the new text 
of the Constitution. If the core of the 1993 Constitution was the principle of 
separation of powers, it was shifted to the principle of “supremacy of people”, 
which according to the 1996 revisions, was expressed and guaranteed by the 
President. 
• In October 1998, another referendum took place in the Kyrgyz Republic that 
introduced private property rights over lands for the citizens of the Kyrgyz 
Republic and recalculated deputy seats in both chambers of parliament. 
Finally, new revisions of the constitution took away the inviolability of MPs 
of the parliament that were guaranteed by the previous constitution. 
• The February 2003 referendum, among other things, reintroduced a one-
chamber (single house) Parliament and lowered the number of Members 
of Parliament (MPs) from 105 to 75. Higher arbitration court was merged 
with the Supreme Court.
• 2006: under the pressure of the opposition the compromised constitution was 
adopted between Bakiev and the opposition that have decreased Presidential 
powers that were highly extended by Akaev.
• 2007 Bakiev used the referendum to amend the constitution that pretty 
much brought back the 2003 version of it. 
• 2010: New text of the Constitution was adopted as a result of the April 2010 
uprisings which introduced the premier-presidential form of governance. 
34 Konstitucia Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan], May 5,1993, adopted by the 
Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz Republic.
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• 2016: Number of amendments were introduced to the 2010 text of the 
constitution. The most important ones are revocation of citizenship and 
change of the status of international treaties on human rights. 
This chronology of events reflect how a constitution, the supreme law of 
the land, can be used by the political branches of government as a tool for 
their own self-empowerment and ambitions. However, this research does not 
aim at reflecting all those revisions and amendments. Rather, it targets recent 
constitutional reforms and its influence on the current conditions and future 
development of constitutionalism in the Kyrgyz Republic.
One of the controversial decision of the Court was the advisory opinion35 
on the new draft of the text of the Constitution developed based on 1994 
referendum. As a result of the referendum Parliament was divided into two 
chambers with substantially low number of MPs instead of one house parliament 
as it used to be before. This strategy and constitutional move enabled President 
Akaev to diffuse the power of the parliament, thus making it more adoptable to 
presidential control. Further political developments in Kyrgyzstan reflected this 
specific hypothesis, namely Akaev was able to adapt Parliament to presidential 
control. Constitutional Court found the draft of the text in accordance with 
the constitution and moreover stated that such redistribution of power within 
the parliament ensures the protection of the constitution and the system of 
separation of powers. 
 Another heatedly debated decision of the court was on presidential 
elections. On July 13, 1998 constitutional court of the KR allowed36 President 
Akaev to be re-elected for 3rd term claiming that his first presidential term 
(1991-1995) does not count due to the fact Kyrgyzstan had not yet adopted the 
constitution of the independent state back then. This decision allowed Akaev 
to run for another presidential term, which technically was his 3rd one, thus 
35 Reshenie Konstitucionnogo Suda Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki po proektu zakona KR o vnesenii izmeneniy v konstitucii 
KR [Decision of the Constitutional Court of the KR on draft law on introducing admentment to the Constitution], 
November 9, 1995. 
36 Reshenie Konstitusionnogo Suda Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 13 iulya 1998 goda [The Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of the Kyrgyz Republic of Jul. 13, 1998], Jul. 13, 1998.
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enabling him to overcome the constitutional limitations proscribed by Article 
43 of 1993 Constitution. 
Thus, in the face of political stability and certainty constitutional court chose 
the path which led to being a loyal agent of the president. For over 10 years 
President Akaev has been empowering the constitutional court for the purposes 
of expanding his own powers. 
The uprisings of 2005 and so called “tulip revolution”, as a result of which 
President Akaev had to flee Kyrgyzstan, completely changed political situation. 
Newly elected President Bakiev had been constantly confronted by a strong 
opposition and he did not have a strong influence over Parliament as Akaev 
used to have. Various political actors have been trying to push through the new 
draft of the Constitution including President Bakiev. In 2006, Parliament by 
majority vote introduced changes to the Constitution by substantially increasing 
its own power. By unanimous decision Constitutional Court annulled the reforms 
introduced by Parliament until the new Constitution will be adopted by a way 
of referendum.37 
Another decision of the Kyrgyz CC that has been reached shortly after the 
previous one during the politically fragmented and uncertain times also greatly 
contributes to the main hypothesis. The same year after the new constitution 
was adopted by a mean of referendum first party-based parliamentary elections 
took place. As a result of the elections pro-Bakiev political party gained the 
majority vote. By the decision of the Central Election Commission opposition 
party was excluded from gaining seats in the Parliament. This was done by 
strict application of 5% threshold. However, constitutional court overruled the 
decision of the Commission and one of the strongest opposition parties were 
allowed to gain seats in the parliament.38 This case is also a demonstration of 
Court`s neutrality and overall willingness to reach pro-democratic decision when 
political situation in State is not stable and uncertain. 
37 Reshenie Konstitusionnogo Suda Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 14 sentyabrya 2007 goda [The Decision of the Con-
stitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic] Sep. 14, 2007.
38 Reshenie Konstitusionnogo Suda Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 2008 goda [The Decision of the Constitutional Court 
of the Kyrgyz Republic], 2008.
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However, this attitude of the court for being neutral and pro-democratic did 
not last long. Within the period of 2007-2009 President Bakiev have managed 
to gain a substantial control over the political situation in Kyrgyzstan. This 
accordingly led the Court to become a loyal agent of the President again in 
second time. 
In 2009, Constitutional Court of the KR upheld the constitutionality of the 
reform presented by Bakiev.39 The constitutional reform granted some Presidential 
Council that never existed before, the right to determine who will perform the 
duties of the President if he/she for some reason, early resigns. In this case, the 
decision will be taken by a majority vote of all the participants of the Council. 
This gesture taken by the President can be easily tied to his attempts to prepare 
his son Maksim Bakiev to become his successor. 
Accordingly, one can see the constant shift of the roles of the court from 
being a loyal agent of the president to more neutral and independent decision-
maker. The primary reason behind this shift lies on constant change of regime and 
uprisings that took place in Kyrgyzstan. In response to Bakiev`s abuse of power, 
Kyrgyzstan experienced another coup d'etat in 2010 which brought tremendous 
changes both to our Constitution and overall institutional framework. 
The constitutional reform of 2010 produced a new constitution for the Kyrgyz 
Republic with substantial revisions in terms of the system of separation of powers 
and checks and balances.40 From a relatively strong and concentrated presidential 
system of governance, the Kyrgyz Republic began a premier-presidential hybrid 
system of government. Accordingly, this section will explore those major changes 
under the 2010 Constitution, including the power of the Constitutional Chamber 
to maintain or improve balance of power between the political branches while 
strengthening constitutional stability. 
 One of the key differences between the 2010 Constitution and all other 
previous versions is in the introduction of “parliamentarism”. This will be the 
39 Zakluchenie Konstitucionnogo Suda KR po proektu zakona o vnisenii izmeneniy v Konstitisiu Kyrgyzskoi Re-
spubliki vnesennogo Prezidentom KR na rassmotrenie JK [The Conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the KR 
on the draft law on introducing amendments to the constitution proposed by the President for a review of the 
Supreme Council of the KR] Jan.21, 2010.
40 Konstituciya Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki [Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic] 27 June 2010.
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underlining basis for overview of the current constitution. In the classical 
parliamentary system, the president is elected not by people but by parliament. 
The current Constitution of the KR preserved both an elected President and 
Parliament. However, the powers of president have been reduced, but not 
eliminated. Due to the fact that this is a new constitutional design for Kyrgyzstan, 
and due to the collegial nature of the parliament and lack of strongly established 
political parties, this was a good solution to counter-balance Parliament with 
elected President. 
The unlikely governmental toppling, the ‘second revolution’ of April 2010, 
materializing to the surprise of the by-then very confident regime of Bakiyev, 
resulted in a severe political vacuum. Overnight, there was no president, no 
prime minister and cabinet, no parliament, and soon enough, not even the 
constitutional court. As the legitimating instrument of Bakiyev’s rule, even the 
constitution could not be held up as any basis of authority. But even more than 
the collapse of nearly the entire institutional system of government, it was the 
relatively level field of victorious revolutionaries, about a dozen politicians, that 
provided for the atmosphere of indeterminacy and anarchy at the time. Taught 
by the bitter lesson of post-March 2005 developments, when the granting of 
authority to one person soon resulted in complete dominance of that person, the 
key political leaders in 2010 resisted any such authorization of one of them. The 
resulting Provisional Government41 was a group of fourteen seasoned politicians, 
each with supreme ambitions, each commanding significant financial and 
political support of their own, each with a team of power-and reward-hungry 
functionaries and clients behind them. If Kyrgyzstan had ever been looking for 
a balance of powers, that fortuitous period was its best situation of balance. 
What that balance lacked, obviously, was any legitimate and legal basis of power, 
except the unconvincing rhetoric about popular revolutionary mandate and the 
even less convincing “dressing” of all decisions by decrees. Due to the fact that 
this is a new constitutional design for Kyrgyzstan, due to collegial nature of the 
41 Dekret Vremennego Pravitel`stva Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [The Decree of the Interim Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic] Apr.7, 2007, No. 1. 
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parliament and lack of strongly established political parties, this was a good 
solution to counter-balance Parliament with elected President.
As a result of 2010 events Constitutional Court of the KR was dismissed 
and replaced by a Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, which started 
functioning since 2013. One of the key differences of 2010 constitution with all 
other previous texts of the constitution is in the introduction of “parliamentarism”. 
This will be the underlining basis for overview of the current constitution. 
Usually in classical parliamentary system president is elected not by people but 
by parliament. Current Constitution of the KR reserved both elected President 
and Parliament. However, the powers of president have been gradually reduced 
yet not diminished them completely. The Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Court is a special institution empowered to exercise constitutional 
review following a centralized model. Primary sources regulating the activities 
of the Chamber is the Constitution and Constitutional law on Constitutional 
Chamber and Constitutional law on status of Judges.42 The abovementioned legal 
framework empowers the Chamber to exercise both a priori (in concluding the 
constitutionality of international treaties not entered into force for Kyrgyzstan 
and concluding the constitutionality of amendments to current constitution) 
and ex post factum review (review the constitutionality of normative legal acts) 
along with the abstract review. Thus, the Chamber is a hybrid of the German 
and French models of constitutional review. In comparison to previous Kyrgyz 
Constitutions, such as the Constitution of 2007, the powers of the Chamber 
have been limited in terms of its involvement into political arena, namely, the 
Chamber can no longer review the election results. The Constitutional Chamber 
started its work very promisingly however it did not last long.
The Chamber`s decision regarding the mandate of the Prosecutor General’s 
office gave rise to criticism that was indicative.43 Influential deputies of the 
42 Konstitucionnuj zakon Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki o Konstitucionnoj palate Verhovnogo suda Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki 
[Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic] June 13, 2011, 
No. 37. Konstitucionnuj zakon Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki o statuse sudej Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki [Constitutional Law 
on the Status of Judges in the Kyrgyz Republic] July 9, 2008, No. 141.
43 Reshenie Konstitusionnoi Palaty Verhovnogo Suda Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki po delu o proverke konstitusionnosti 
stat`I 34 UKRKR [The Decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of the KR on case involving 
the constitutionality of article 34 of the CPCRK] Jan.13, 2014.
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parliament as well as representatives of the presidential office–and the president 
himself at a later point–greeted the decision with disapproving surprise, public 
denouncements of the court and its judges, and eventually even with proposals to 
cut down the eleven-judge court to nine (that is, to forego filling the two vacant 
seats, thereby opening a precedent for later modifications of the Constitutional 
Chamber’s legal foundations). The fact that the court issued a reconciliatory 
follow-up explanation of its decision, where it said that the decision had no 
retroactive effect and all business conducted differently from the decision till 
now would remain valid, was a worrisome symptom.
Furthermore, there were number of further decisions of constitutional 
chamber that could greatly demonstrate severe challenges to the establishment 
of constitutionalism in Kyrgyzstan. However, there were worrisome signs 
that changes might be coming, including unequivocal speeches of President 
Atambayev to that extent and later the actual referendum of 2016 took place 
with all possible procedural and substantive violations of the norms of the 
constitution and the legislation on referendum, the regulation of the Parliament 
and other laws. However, the scenario might have been different if Constitutional 
Chamber continued to issue persuasive, even if not always favorable, decisions 
that reaffirmed the spirit of the balanced framework, there might be some 
robust achievements to boast. However, at certain point, particularly after the 
Judgment on Biometric registration44 when President showed certain pressure 
on the Chamber, they have become too cautious and self-restraint. Thus, just 
like for other presidents (Akaev and Bakiev) it was now easier for Atambaev to 
make the constitutional referendum and pass the amendments and also receive 
the support of the Constitutional Chamber.45
Primary challenges for Kyrgyzstan for constitutional implementation 
predominantly were the failure to establish the state based on Constitutionalism. 
44 Reshenie Konstitucionnoi Palaty Verhovnogo Suda Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki po delu o proverke konstitucionnosti 
zakona o biometricheskoi registracii grazhdan Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [Decision of the Constitutional Chamber 
of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic on constitutionality of the law on biometric registration of the 
citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic] September 14, 2015 No. 11-р.
45 Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki o naznachenii referenduma po proektu po proektu zakona Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 
ot 2 noyabrya 2016 goda [Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on calling the referendum on introduced amendments 
to the Constitution of the KR] November 2, 2016.
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Thus, producing a “constitution without constitutionalism”. This further led to 
the 2016 constitutional amendments and substantial weakening of the work 
of the Constitutional Chamber and furthermore the weakening of the viable 
balance of power. 
III. CONCLUSION
Application of basic principles revolving around the constitutionalism into 
third wave democracies, produced such phenomenon as constitutions “without 
constitutionalism”. This paper revisited and discussed this issue in the context 
of the Kyrgyz Republic. Main argument and thesis of the paper was following: 
Where a viable balance of power exists, a constitutional court acquires importance 
as a key element of that order, thus promoting the constitutionalism. If no such 
balance exists, the constitutional court will soon become a tool of the more 
dominant powers and thus lose its relevance for a genuine constitutional order. 
The abovementioned thesis was demonstrated by the example of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. It first provided a proper foundation and basic understanding of 
constitutionalism, further revisited this concept in the context of Former Soviet 
Union and finally discussed the development of constitutionalism in Kyrgyzstan 
along with challenges faced by the constitutional review mechanism. 
Thus, primary challenges for Kyrgyzstan for constitutional implementation 
predominantly were the failure to establish the state based on Constitutionalism. 
Thus, producing a “constitution without constitutionalism”. This further led to 
the 2016 constitutional amendments and substantial weakening of the work 
of the Constitutional Chamber and furthermore the weakening of the viable 
balance of power.
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